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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine the secondary loan price reaction to dividend announcements. 
Using a sample of loans from 254 US firms covering the period between 2000 and 2016, I find that 
loans are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns around dividend cut 
announcements, consistent with the information content hypothesis. In contrast, there are no 
abnormal returns around dividend increase announcements. Further analysis shows that the 
information content effect of dividend increases is offset by the wealth transfer effect. The results 
provide evidence that the information content and the wealth redistribution hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive, and loan prices react according to the combination of both hypotheses. 
Additionally, empirical evidence indicates that cash holdings, monitoring incentives, the structure 
of debt contracts, and covenants can help mitigate the costs arising from agency conflicts.   
 
Keywords: Secondary loan market, dividend changes, information content, wealth 
redistribution, financial contracting 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Abnormal stock price responses to dividend changes have been the subject of extensive 
theoretical and empirical research. Collectively, the empirical studies’ results show positive 
(negative) abnormal stock returns after announcements of dividend increases (decreases), 
suggesting that dividend increases convey positive news, whereas dividend reductions convey 
negative news to the equity market. Despite extensive research on stock prices and dividend 
changes, researchers have paid little attention to the secondary loan market price reaction to 
dividend changes. Given that loans are secured and usually contain covenants preventing the 
payment of dividends, it is unclear whether dividend increases (cuts) convey positive (negative) 
news to the secondary loan market as they do for the equity market. No study has examined the 
effect of dividend changes on secondary loan prices; this thesis fills this gap in the literature.  
Two main theoretical arguments could explain how secondary loan market prices might 
react to dividend changes: the information content of dividends and the wealth transfer hypotheses. 
Both hypotheses predict that in reaction to the information content of dividends, stock prices will 
rise after a dividend increase and decline after a dividend cut. However, the two hypotheses offer 
different predictions for loan price behaviour. The information content hypothesis suggests a 
positive effect on loan prices around dividend increase announcements and a negative effect around 
dividend cut announcements; consequently, stock and loan returns are positively correlated. This 
hypothesis suggests that an increase in dividends will convey positive information about a firm’s 
financial position and ability to repay its debt, whereas dividend cuts convey negative information 
about the firm’s financial state. In contrast, the wealth redistribution hypothesis predicts a negative 
loan price effect around a dividend increase and a positive effect around dividend cuts; therefore, 
stock and loan returns are negatively correlated. This hypothesis implies that the market value 
changes in equity and debt result from the transfer of wealth between market participants; therefore, 
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the firm’s future performance is not affected after a dividend change. Since the two hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive, the effect of one hypothesis can possibly offset that of the other. 
Previous studies have examined the impact of dividend announcements on bond prices, 
obtaining mixed results. These studies have attempted to ascertain whether dividend changes 
represent a signal to bondholders or transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders. Some 
researchers find that the information content effect dominates the wealth transfer effect in the bond 
market. Woolridge (1983) demonstrates that unexpected dividend increases are associated with an 
increase in bond prices, whereas dividend decreases are linked to a reduction in bond prices. 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) report an asymmetrical reaction of bond prices to unexpected 
dividend change announcements. They find that unexpected dividend increases have no effect on 
bond prices, but dividend reductions negatively affect them. Tsai and Wu’s (2015) research results 
show that abnormal stock and bond returns are positively related to unexpected dividend changes. 
Zhao (2016) reports the same asymmetrical reaction as that noted by Handjinicolaou and Kalay 
(1984), where bonds of companies with a dividend decrease have significantly negative abnormal 
returns, whereas bonds of companies that announce a dividend increase do not experience 
statistically significant results. 
The wealth transfer effect has also been documented in the bond market surrounding 
dividend changes. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) report a negative bond price reaction to large 
dividend increases and a positive bond price reaction to large dividend decreases. Furthermore, 
they find a negative correlation between bond and stock price reactions. Mathur, Singh, 
Nejadmalayeri, and Jiraporn (2013) even find a set of results supporting both hypotheses as a 
function of the size of the event. In their study, bondholders negatively react to a dividend cut, and 
while bondholders view dividend increases in small amounts as positive signals, large dividend 
payouts are viewed negatively.  
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Secondary market loans differ from public bonds in many ways. Banks have a comparative 
advantage in information production and monitoring, whereas bondholders have a smaller 
incentive to monitor the firm (Parlour & Plantin, 2008). Consistent with the monitoring advantage 
of loans over bonds, Altman, Gande, and Saunders (2010) find that the secondary loan market is 
informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Additionally, 
lead lenders generate proprietary information through periodic evaluations compared with 
bondholders who mostly rely on publicly available information (Altman et al., 2010; Parlour & 
Plantin, 2008). Regarding liquidity, Bhasin and Carey (1999) note the resemblance of bonds to 
equities in the sense that safer bonds are more liquid; however, this is not the case in the secondary 
loan market where riskier loans are more liquid. Moreover, Gande and Saunders’ (2012) study 
shows that firms announcing loan sales attract positive abnormal stock returns, whereas firms 
declaring bond placements accumulate negative abnormal stock returns. These results suggest a 
difference between the bond and the secondary loan markets.  
Given the empirical evidence on the difference between bonds and loans, two theoretical 
perspectives would provide some direction on how loan prices might react to dividend changes. 
The first one is that banks generate propriety information and are more knowledgeable about firms 
than bondholders; therefore, an announcement of dividend changes would be less surprising to 
loanholders and would have a smaller impact on loan prices compared with bond prices. The 
second one is that banks have greater monitoring incentives compared with bondholders; therefore, 
if a wealth transfer effect occurs around dividend changes, it would be smaller in the secondary 
loan market than in the bond market.  
To examine the loan price reaction to dividend announcements, I perform four tests: an 
event study with mean tests to measure abnormal stock and loan returns, a panel ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with slope tests, a correlation test, and wealth transfer regressions. I 
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examine a sample of 153 US firms with 45 dividend cuts, and 581 dividend increases from 2000 
to 2016. 
The mean tests indicate that loan prices react to dividend changes according to the 
information content of dividends hypothesis, where an increase in dividends is followed by an 
increase in loan prices, and a dividend cut is followed by a reduction in loan prices. However, after 
controlling for firm and loan characteristics, the slope test reflects an asymmetrical loan price 
reaction to dividend changes, where a dividend increase has no effect. The correlation test suggests 
a possible transfer of wealth from loanholders to stockholders in the short term, when firms have 
an increase in dividends. 
Lastly, the regressions of abnormal loan and stock dollar returns provide direct evidence 
that in some cases, loanholders react according to the information content hypothesis, whereas in 
others, a significant portion of the stock reaction to a dividend increase is explained by the transfer 
of wealth from loanholders to stockholders. Loanholders negatively react to a dividend increase 
when their claim on the firm’s assets is high and their monitoring incentives are low; therefore, 
they rely more on covenants as cheap forms of monitoring and negatively react to the dividend 
covenant’s failure to prevent future cash distributions. 
Studying debt is important because bank loans are expected to be insulated from corporate 
events due to their high priority, short maturity, security, constant monitoring, and covenant 
restrictions (Billett, Elkamhi, Mauer, & Pungaliya, 2015). Clearly, dividend changes are positively 
related to stock prices; however, the effect of such announcements on secondary loan prices has 
not been investigated. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to examine the impact of 
dividend announcements on loan prices. Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature 
examining the interaction between debt and equity markets, studies debt instruments’ reactions to 
corporate events, and improves the understanding of the role of dividends in corporate finance. 
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I have organized the rest of the thesis as follows: In Chapter 2, I present an overview of the 
literature about the secondary loan market and dividend policies. The results of studies examining 
the bond price reaction to dividend announcements and repurchases are included as well. In 
Chapter 3, I develop the hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I describe the sample selection and the research 
methodology. In Chapter 5, I report about the descriptive statistics and the results, which are 
discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, I provide the conclusions and the study’s limitations, 
as well as areas for future research.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the loan market 
The US loan market typically includes two broad categories: a primary loan market, where 
syndicated loans are originated, and a secondary loan market, where entire loans or parts of them 
are subsequently traded after syndication (Gande & Saunders, 2012; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
“A syndicated loan is one that is provided by a group of lenders and is structured, arranged, and 
administered by one or several commercial or investment banks known as arrangers” (Miller & 
Chew, 2011, p. 7).1 The lead arranger or agent establishes the main relationship with the firm and 
states the terms of the contract (Sufi, 2007). Despite a single loan contract agreement, each member 
of the syndicate is a direct lender to the borrower (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000). For a brief 
description of the loan syndication process, see Appendix A.  
The secondary market for syndicated loans has quickly grown over the past three decades. 
This market developed slowly until the early 1980s, after which it entered a period of rapid growth, 
largely due to highly leveraged transactions to ﬁnance leveraged buyouts, stock repurchases, and 
mergers and acquisitions (Gande & Saunders, 2012). As the 1990s progressed, banks and 
institutional investors increasingly started using the market to buy and sell seasoned loans (Bhasin 
& Carey, 1999). During that decade, the US loan market expanded in volume. See Appendix B for 
a timeline of events that promoted secondary trading in the syndicated loan market.  
Figure 1 displays the US annual secondary trading volume in billions of dollars from the 
mid-1990s through 2016. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Standard & Poor’s (S&P) guide to the loan market provides an excellent primer on the 
syndicated loan market. 
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Figure 1. Annual loan trading volume from 1995 to 2016  
Source: Marsh and Basta (2017) 
  
The secondary loan market is an over-the-counter market, which includes both investment-
grade and non-investment grade loans. The literature shows that non-investment-grade borrowers 
have more liquid loans with higher spreads compared with investment-grade borrowers (Gupta, 
Singh, & Zebedee, 2008; Santos & Nigro, 2009). Additionally, approximately 90% of sold loans 
involve borrowers with a credit rating; credit ratings decrease information asymmetry and lower 
the loan spreads (Drucker & Puri, 2009; Santos & Nigro, 2009; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
Loans are typically term loans with longer maturities, back-end-loaded repayment schedules, 
restructuring purposes, and higher interest rates (Bhasin & Carey, 1999; Drucker & Puri, 2009; 
Jiang, Li, & Shao, 2010; Lim, Minton, & Weisbach, 2014; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008).  
The demand of the secondary loan market has been driven almost exclusively by non-bank 
institutional investors, such as hedge funds, private equity funds, mutual funds, pension funds, 
insurance companies, and finance companies (Ivashina & Sun, 2011a; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
Loans with institutional investor participation are more likely to be resold on the secondary market 
as these investors have a higher demand for liquidity (Ivashina & Sun, 2011a; Massoud, Nandy, 
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Saunders, & Song, 2011). Some institutional investors simultaneously hold both equity and debt in 
the same firms (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010). Institutional investors that participate in a loan syndicate 
generate private information and can profit by short-selling a firm’s equity. There is some evidence 
that following loan amendments, institutional investors have superior information and outperform 
other investors when trading equities (Ivashina & Sun, 2011b; Massoud et al., 2011). In contrast, 
when institutional investors hold equity positions in a firm, abnormal spreads are higher when they 
purchase a larger portion of the loan facility (Lim et al., 2014). 
 
2.2 Costs and benefits of loan sales 
Investors are interested in selling/buying loans in the secondary market to comply with risk-
based capital requirements, maintain a diversified portfolio, enhance their fee-based income or 
return, and even trade on private information (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; Drucker & Puri, 2009; 
Gupta et al., 2008; Ivashina & Sun, 2011b; Parlour & Plantin, 2008; Santos & Nigro, 2009). 
Although the secondary loan market benefits investors, it ultimately benefits borrowers through 
easier and cheaper access to credit in the primary market, as well as additional bank funding 
(Drucker & Puri, 2009; Gande & Saunders, 2012; Kamstra, Roberts, & Shao, 2014; Santos & Nigro, 
2009). Bank loan sales are perceived as costly to borrowers because they lead to a decline in bank 
monitoring incentives, higher fees payable to the lead arranger, and more restrictive covenants 
(Bhasin & Carey, 1999; Drucker & Puri, 2009). Loan sales may also increase the number of 
syndicate members, making future renegotiations more difficult (Kamstra et al., 2014; Santos & 
Nigro, 2009). See Appendix C for more details on the benefits and the costs of loan sales. 
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2.3 Agency and information problems in loan sales 
The secondary loan market brings up potential agency problems involving both adverse 
selection2 and moral hazard.3 According to the literature, four contractual features could mitigate 
agency problems: the lead lender retaining a portion of the loan, issuing a repurchase guarantee, 
the use of covenants, and cash distributions to stakeholders. The proportion of the loan that the lead 
lender needs to retain mainly depends on its reputation and the borrower’s credit rating and 
transparency; borrowers with a poor reputation might need to issue a repurchase guarantee, in case 
the loan underperforms, to make the loan more attractive to investors (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; 
Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995; Sufi, 2007; Winton & Yerramilli, 2015; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
Covenants constitute a cheaper form of monitoring that allows lenders to take legal action in a 
timely manner before severe losses are incurred; covenants can also constrain managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Drucker & Puri, 2009; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). Lastly, John, 
Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015) argue that firms can precommit to cash distributions to 
debtholders or shareholders to address managerial agency conflicts. Debt payments reduce free 
cash flow and expose managers to additional oversight from external financing markets. 
Additionally, managers with substantial free cash flow can distribute cash to shareholders by 
increasing dividends or repurchasing stocks. Dividend payouts and repurchases reduce the 
resources under managers’ control that would otherwise be invested in low-return projects or 
wasted (Farooq & Jabbouri, 2015; Jensen, 1986). 
                                                 
2 Arrangers have the incentive to sell loans that they privately know will likely perform poorly; as 
a result, a loan sale could convey negative information about the borrower (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; 
Drucker & Puri, 2009; Kamstra, Roberts, & Shao, 2014). 
3 After the loan is removed from the balance sheet, banks would lack the incentive to produce costly 
credit information and monitor the borrower (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995; Sufi, 
2007).  
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Loan selling separates loan origination, monitoring, and funding, which also introduces 
information asymmetry. 4  Increasing the amount and the quality of information available to 
participant lenders, as well as choosing participant lenders that are geographically closer to the firm 
and have previously been on a syndicated loan with the arranger can help reduce information 
asymmetries (Sufi, 2007; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). For more details about the empirical 
findings on agency and information asymmetry problems, refer to Appendix D. 
Even when agency and information problems are evident in the secondary loan market, 
lenders do not simply sell non-performing loans because most loans are sold at close to par value 
(Drucker & Puri, 2009). The secondary loan market has transformed banks into underwriter-like 
financial intermediaries and has allowed them to convert their illiquid assets into liquid assets 
(Gande & Saunders, 2012; Ivashina & Sun, 2011b; Kamstra et al., 2014). 
 
2.4 Dividend changes and the equity market 
The abnormal stock price response to dividend changes has been the subject of extensive 
theoretical and empirical research. Since earnings and dividend figures are two of the most 
important signalling devices used by the management to convey information to stockholders, early 
research has focused on examining whether dividend changes transmit information beyond that 
disseminated in earnings. Pettit (1972) finds support for the proposition that the market uses 
announcements of changes in dividend payments to assess the value of a security, while Watts 
(1973) concludes that the information conveyed by dividend changes could only be trivial. Laub 
(1976) reports that dividends do convey information in addition to that transmitted by earnings.  
                                                 
4 As delegated monitors, lead lenders hold more private information than loan participants. These 
informed lenders receive an extensive information set based on multiple credit reviews, allowing them to 
obtain a more precise evaluation about the borrower (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
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To isolate the information contained in earnings announcements, Aharony and Swary 
(1980) examine quarterly dividend changes that precede or follow quarterly earnings 
announcements by at least 10 days. Their study has three main results: (1) Stockholders of 
companies that increase their dividends earn, on average, positive abnormal returns. (2) 
Stockholders of companies that decrease their dividends earn, on average, negative abnormal 
returns. (3) Stockholders of companies that do not change their dividends earn, on average, only 
normal returns. Their study’s results strongly support the hypothesis that dividends contain useful 
information beyond that already provided by earnings figures.  
These studies have left unanswered the question of whether investors evaluate dividends 
and earnings announcements in relation to each other. In investigating this issue, Kane, Lee, and 
Marcus (1984) discover a statistically significant interaction effect. They conclude that earnings 
and dividend surprises can, by themselves, induce abnormal stock returns; however, unanticipated 
dividend increases (decreases) are more relevant when earnings are also above (below) 
expectations. 
Collectively, empirical studies commonly report positive (negative) abnormal stock returns 
after announcements of dividend increases (decreases). The following cited studies have focused 
on examining the information driving this price change. Several hypotheses, including the 
information content of dividends, free cash flow, and wealth redistribution, have been formulated 
to explain such market responses.  
The information content hypothesis states that managers are more informed than external 
stakeholders about company performance; therefore, unexpected dividend changes are viewed as 
signals containing information about future earnings (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). The evidence 
suggesting that announcements of unexpected dividends contain information about future earnings 
is mixed and thus inconclusive. While some researchers find a positive and significant relation 
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between dividend changes and future earnings (e.g., Aharony & Dotan, 1994), others note that 
dividend changes do not signal changes in future profitability (Benartzi, Michaely, & Thaler, 1997; 
Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, & Thaler, 2005; Nissim & Ziv, 2001).  
An alternative explanation about the information contained in dividends is that dividends 
function as signals of free cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1994). Both 
signalling hypotheses suggest that dividend changes are positively related to a firm’s financial 
strength. In contrast, the wealth redistribution hypothesis states that the stock price reaction results 
from the transfer of wealth from debtholders to equity holders (Dhillon & Johnson, 1994; 
Woolridge, 1983); therefore, a dividend change does not reflect a change in a firm’s financial 
performance. Although the effect of a dividend change has been proven to be positively related to 
the equity market, the effect of dividend changes on the loan market has received little attention. 
 
2.5 Dividend changes and the debt market 
Most research on dividends and debts is found in the corporate finance literature that 
examines the agency relationship. In an agency relationship, a principal engages an agent’s service 
on his/her behalf, delegating decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Managers are thereby the agents of shareholders, a relationship fraught with agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986). Appendix E describes corporate governance alternatives involving debt and equity 
instruments that can address agency problems between managers and shareholders. 
Jiang et al. (2010) propose two hypotheses regarding the conflicts between shareholders 
and creditors. First, the incentive alignment hypothesis suggests that shareholders who are also 
creditors have an incentive to monitor and prevent managers and other shareholders from 
expropriating wealth from creditors. Second, the information hypothesis proposes that dual holders 
have an informational advantage that allows them to select companies with lower default risks and 
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that are able to predict the future evolution of a borrower’s credit quality. Jiang et al. find that dual 
holders alleviate the conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders, leading to lower loan 
yield spreads without increasing covenants.  
Research on emerging markets has found that high dividend payout ratios reduce 
information asymmetry; consequently, creditors demand lower returns of their capital provided to 
firms (Farooq & Jabbouri, 2015). Billett et al. (2015) find that financial contracting and debt 
priority structure can help mitigate the costs arising from stockholder and bondholder conflicts. 
Researchers have also studied the impact of covenants that restrict the payment of dividends in 
loan contracts. Almost 60% of the loans in Billett et al. (2015) study sample have covenants 
restricting dividends to equity holders. Dividend restricting covenants and dividend payouts are 
negatively related, suggesting loan contracting as an effective tool that minimizes dividend 
payments (Allen, Gottesman, Saunders, & Tang, 2012). However, dividend restrictions come with 
a cost for the firm since borrowers receive a higher interest rate (Gupta et al., 2008).  
In their study about the role of banks in dividend policy, Allen et al. (2012) address the 
bank–stockholder incentive conflict rather than the bondholder–stockholder agency problem. They 
hypothesize that dividend payouts should decline in the presence of substantial bank lending, for 
two reasons. First, as delegated monitors, banks acts as an effective governance mechanism that 
reduces the cost of precommitting to a dividend policy. Second, banks limit dividend payouts to 
protect the integrity of its senior claim on a firm’s assets. Allen et al. find evidence of both corporate 
governance and cash flow protection motivations, documenting a negative relationship between 
bank lending intensity and dividend payout policy. Their study also shows that covenants and 
having large institutional shareholders in the loan syndicate, that monitor the management’s 
activities, effectively reduce dividends. 
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Despite extensive empirical research about the secondary loan market and dividend policy, 
researchers have paid little attention to the impact of dividend change announcements on loan 
prices. Previous studies have only examined the impact of open market repurchases (OMRs) and 
dividend announcements on bond prices. Wealth redistribution and information content are the two 
hypotheses emerging from investigations on bond reaction to corporate events. The information 
content hypothesis predicts that dividend changes would be positively related to stock and loan 
returns; consequently, stock and loan returns should be positively correlated. Alternatively, the 
wealth redistribution hypothesis suggests that dividend changes would be positively related to 
stock returns but negatively related to loan returns; therefore, stock and loan returns should be 
negatively correlated.  
Several studies have attempted to ascertain whether a dividend change represents a signal 
to bondholders or a transfer of wealth between shareholders and bondholders. Some researchers 
find that the information content effect dominates the wealth transfer effect in the bond market. 
Woolridge (1983) demonstrates that unexpected dividend increases (decreases) are associated with 
positive (negative) debt and preferred stock returns, indicating the information content of dividends 
theory as the primary factor influencing security prices. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) are the 
first scholars to develop a methodology to control for infrequent trading and changes in the term 
structure of interest rates while examining the impact of a change in dividends on the price of bonds. 
Their methodology has been followed by several researchers, who report an asymmetrical reaction 
of bond prices to unexpected dividend change announcements. In particular, they find that 
unexpected dividend increases have no effect on bond prices, while dividend reductions negatively 
affect bond prices. Their results support the information content hypothesis, indicating that gains 
from dividend increases are captured only by stockholders. Thus, stockholders prevent bondholders 
from participating in a firm’s increased profitability. In contrast, when a dividend reduction occurs, 
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stockholders let bondholders share the loss. For a highly leveraged firm, bondholders are the main 
losers since their losses are greater, the higher the firm’s financial leverage is. 
Tsai and Wu (2015) also find results consistent with the information content of dividends 
hypothesis. They divide their sample into six groups: positive, negative, and neutral changes in 
speculative and investment-grade bonds. Their results show that abnormal stock and bond returns 
are positively related to unexpected dividend changes. The magnitude of dividend changes is also 
weakly related to future profitability, and speculative-grade bonds are more informative than 
investment-grade bonds. Zhao (2016) investigates stocks and bonds from 1995 to 2008, using a 
dummy variable to distinguish any intercept or slope change to the corporate bond yield following 
a dividend change. She reports the same asymmetrical reaction as noted by Handjinicolaou and 
Kalay (1984), where bonds of companies with a dividend decrease have significantly negative 
abnormal returns, whereas bonds of companies that announce a dividend increase do not obtain 
statistically significant results.  
In contrast, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) report a negative bond price reaction to large 
dividend increases and a positive bond price reaction to large dividend decreases. Their subsamples 
include dividend initiations, omissions, large dividend increases (exceeding 30%), large dividend 
decreases (exceeding 30%), and small dividend decreases. Furthermore, they find a negative 
correlation between bond and stock price reactions, consistent with the wealth redistribution 
hypothesis. Mathur et al. (2013) research results support both information content and wealth 
redistribution hypotheses. In their study, bondholders react negatively to a dividend cut, and while 
bondholders view dividend increases in small amounts as positive signals, large dividend payouts 
are perceived negatively. 
Other researchers have examined the bond market reaction to repurchases, using both 
hypotheses and obtaining mixed results. Dann (1981) examines the effects of OMR on the values 
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of common stocks, bonds, and preferred stocks. He concludes that the returns are consistent with 
the information signal hypothesis,5 where common stockholders are the main beneficiaries of value 
increments, but no examined securities decline in value as a result of a repurchase. In contrast, 
Nishikawa, Prevost, and Rao (2011) do not detect any transfer of wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders surrounding an OMR. Furthermore, they find no significant correlations between 
bond and stock returns, an important implication of the wealth transfer hypothesis. Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) present evidence consistent with both hypotheses, concluding that the loss to 
bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase and the firm’s financial risk.  
In contrast to these papers, I investigate bank loan prices instead of bonds. The loan market 
differs from the bond market in many ways. Banks have a comparative cost advantage in 
information production (Altman et al., 2010); through periodic evaluations, they generate 
proprietary information compared with bondholders who must mostly rely on publicly available 
information (Altman et al., 2010; Parlour & Plantin, 2008). Additionally, lead lenders are able to 
monitor firms better than the bond market; bondholders typically have a smaller incentive to 
monitor firms (Parlour & Plantin, 2008). Regarding liquidity, Bhasin and Carey (1999) find that 
bonds resemble equities in the sense that safer bonds are more liquid; however, this is not the case 
in the secondary loan market where riskier loans are more liquid. Some evidence also shows that 
syndicated loans provide higher returns than traditional bonds (Thomas & Wang, 2004) and that 
the secondary loan market is informationally more efficient than the bond market prior to a loan 
default (Altman et al., 2010).  
The empirical evidence on bond price reaction to corporate events is inconclusive. The loan 
market has received little attention compared with the bond market. Billett et al. (2015) are the first 
                                                 
5 The information content hypothesis is also referred to as the information signal hypothesis or 
signalling hypothesis in other research papers. 
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researchers to examine secondary loan market prices’ response to corporate events. They study the 
influence of financial contracting on agency conflicts between equity holders and creditors by 
examining the impacts of announcements of OMRs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). They 
find that stockholders earn a significantly positive excess return and loanholders earn a 
significantly negative excess return around an OMR announcement. Furthermore, they document 
a negative correlation between the loan announcement effect and the equity announcement effect, 
suggesting the transfer of wealth from loanholders to stockholders. This effect is attenuated when 
the ratio of bank debt to total debt is small, the loan is backed by more collateral, and the bank has 
a long-term relationship with the borrower. In contrast, the loan reacts negatively to the dividend 
covenant’s failure to prevent a share repurchase. Billett et al. (2015) demonstrate that agency 
conflicts are significant in loan agreements. The transfer of wealth from stockholders to loanholders 
is also inversely related in SEO announcements. 
Not all corporate events where managers distribute cash to shareholders are similar. 
Compared with OMRs, dividend commitments are more effective in remedying manager–
shareholder agency conflicts. According to John and colleagues (2015), a repurchase is less 
effective as a precommitment device where managers distribute cash to shareholders in a more 
discretionary and irregular manner than in the case of regular cash dividends. A cash dividend 
represents a strong commitment and is perceived as a “permanent” change by the market (Jensen, 
1986). Thus, the capital markets penalize firms for reducing dividends with a significantly negative 
stock price reduction (e.g., Aharony & Swary, 1980). In contrast, managers can vary the level of 
an OMR, depending on the firms’ needs and the market conditions. Deviations from announced 
repurchases are frequent and are not followed by a negative market reaction (John et al., 2015). 
Hausch and Seward (1993) propose a cash dividend payment as an example of a 
deterministic cash disbursement and a share repurchase as an example of a stochastic cash 
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disbursement. In a deterministic disbursement policy, a firm will certainly distribute a known, 
declared amount of cash to its shareholders. Under a stochastic disbursement policy, the firm 
precommits to a range of possible cash distributions. Studies have shown that firms are more likely 
to announce OMR as an alternative to paying dividends when they have high performance (Billett 
et al., 2015), strong corporate governance (John et al., 2015), and enough cash flow to finance their 
investments (Hausch & Seward, 1993).   
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Although the effect of OMR announcements on bond and loan prices and the effect of 
dividend announcements on the bond market have been researched with mixed results, the effect 
of dividend changes on the secondary loan market has not yet been examined. In this thesis, I 
examine the information content and the wealth redistribution hypotheses around dividend changes 
by using a sample of loans covering the period from 2000 to 2016. 
These two main theoretical arguments (the information content of dividends and the wealth 
redistribution hypotheses) can explain how the secondary loan market prices react to dividend 
changes. Both hypotheses predict that stock prices will react favourably to announcements of 
unexpected dividend increases and unfavourably to unexpected dividend cuts. However, the two 
hypotheses offer different predictions for loan price behaviour around dividend announcements. 
Figure 2 depicts the loan price reaction to each dividend announcement as predicted by the two 
hypotheses. 
Announcement Information content Wealth redistribution 
Dividend increase Positive Negative 
Dividend cut Negative Positive 
 
Figure 2. Loan price reaction to a dividend increase and a dividend cut  
As predicted by the two hypotheses, adapted from Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) 
 
3.2 Information content hypothesis 
The information content hypothesis predicts that unexpected dividend changes positively 
affect a firm’s market value, including both equity and debt. Consequently, the market values of 
equity and debt will increase following a rise in dividends and will decrease following a reduction 
in dividends. This hypothesis also suggests that dividend changes convey information about the 
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firm’s future performance; an increase (a cut) in dividends will lead to an increase (a reduction) in 
the firm’s future profitability. Therefore, an increase in dividends conveys positive information 
about the firm’s financial position and ability to repay its debt, resulting in a positive loan price 
reaction, while dividend cuts convey negative information about the firm’s financial state.  
Loanholders view firms that pay large dividends as less risky and thus require a lower rate 
of return (Mathur et al., 2013). According to the literature, managers will avoid increasing 
dividends that may have to be reversed in the short term (Lintner, 1956) since the market severely 
punishes dividend decreases (Aharony & Swary, 1980). Consequently, a dividend increase 
represents a strong commitment and is perceived as a permanent change (Jensen, 1986).  
Past studies on the information content of dividends hypothesis have focused almost 
exclusively on stock price behaviour around dividend announcements and provide evidence that is 
consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Aharony & Swary, 1980; Laub, 1976; Pettit, 1972). The 
predicted hypothesis effect has also been documented in bond prices and dividend changes 
(Handjinicolaou & Kalay, 1984; Tsai & Wu, 2015; Woolridge, 1983; Zhao, 2016), as well as bond 
prices and repurchases (Dann, 1981). Although the information content hypothesis has been 
examined on the stock and bond market, the effect of a dividend change on the loan market has not 
been investigated. Thus, the information hypothesis makes the following prediction: 
H1a: There is a positive (negative) loan price reaction to a dividend increase (cut). 
 
3.3 Wealth redistribution hypothesis 
The wealth redistribution hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between debt and 
equity, where an increase (decrease) in the equity market value is accompanied by a decrease 
(increase) in the debt market value. Consequently, after a dividend increase, the market value of 
equity will increase, but the market value of debt will decrease; thus, wealth will be transferred 
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from debtholders to stockholders. Alternatively, after a dividend cut, the market value of equity 
will decrease, and the market value of debt will increase; thus, wealth will be transferred from 
stockholders to debtholders. While the information content hypothesis suggests that dividend 
changes convey information about a firm’s future performance, the wealth redistribution 
hypothesis implies that the market value changes in the firm’s equity and debt result from the 
transfer of wealth between market participants; therefore, the firm’s future performance is not 
affected after a dividend change. 
On one hand, the wealth redistribution hypothesis suggests that secondary loan prices will 
positively react to dividend cut announcements because firms will have more cash available to 
service their debt obligations (Allen et al., 2012). On the other hand, firms will negatively react to 
announcements of unexpected dividend increases because dividend payouts reduce the firms’ 
available cash resources to service their debt obligations. Paying higher dividends also exacerbates 
the agency conflict between loanholders and stockholders. Moreover, because of the adverse stock 
market reaction associated with dividend reductions, many firms would rather borrow to avoid 
cutting dividends. The additional leverage increases the firms’ risk, with a consequent decrease in 
loan prices (Mathur et al., 2013). According to Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984), this hypothesis 
stems from the conflicts of interest between debtholders and stockholders in two specific wealth 
redistribution mechanisms: when dividend increases are financed by either issuing new debt or 
reducing investment outlays. Therefore, if a firm finances a dividend increase, wealth is 
redistributed from debtholders to stockholders. To avoid this possibility, security holders shield 
themselves with protective covenants or me-first rules (Woolridge, 1983). 
The predicted wealth transfer effect has been documented in secondary loan prices around 
OMR announcements (Billett et al., 2015) and in the bond market surrounding dividend changes 
(Dhillon & Johnson, 1994). Additionally, Gande and Saunders (2012) find a positive abnormal 
      
 
22 
 
stock return and a negative abnormal bond return around the ﬁrst day of trading of the borrower’s 
loans in the secondary market. They propose that wealth is redistributed from bondholders to 
stockholders due to the higher financial leverage of traded borrowers and an expected decrease in 
the bank’s monitoring incentives after the loan sale. Hence, the wealth transfer hypothesis suggests 
the following: 
H1b: There is a negative (positive) loan price reaction to a dividend increase (cut). 
 
3.4 Overall effect 
For information purposes, the null hypothesis states that there is no change in a firm’s 
market value at the announcement of unexpected dividends. It is unclear if the loan pricing market 
will react to dividend announcements since loans are thought to be secured and typically include 
closely monitored covenants. However, loans have these contractual features because borrowers 
face high agency costs due to information asymmetry and moral hazard (Billett et al., 2015). It is 
possible that loan prices will not react to dividend announcements because loan investors hold 
private information about the firm’s future earnings, and loanholders might protect the integrity of 
their senior claim with covenants. Since the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, the effect 
of the wealth redistribution might be offset by the information contained in dividends. Some 
researchers have found results supporting both hypotheses as functions of the size of the event and 
the risk of the firm’s debt (Mathur et al., 2013; Maxwell & Stephens, 2003). 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
The loan, accounting, and stock return data covering the period between 2000 and 2016 is 
retrieved to empirically test how changes in dividends impact the secondary loan market. Each loan 
in the sample must meet the following criteria: 
1. Firms must have at least one loan with valid data from the Reuters Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan6 syndicated loan database. 
2. Firms must have announced at least two dividend payments to calculate dividend changes. 
Dividend announcements and stock pricing information must be available on the tapes 
constructed by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
3. Borrowers’ accounting information must be available in the Compustat database. 
The sample selection process starts by creating a dataset with dividend information from 
the CRSP tapes, which is later merged with the secondary loan market data. Firms must be listed 
in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NYSE American,7 and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ). Only common shares (Share codes 10 and 
11) with regular monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual dividends (Distribution codes 1222, 
1232, 1242, and 1252) are kept in the sample. Firms in the financial services (SIC codes 6000–
6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–4949) sectors are excluded from the sample since both are 
highly regulated. Furthermore, dividend announcements with a missing announcement date or 
duplicates are dropped from the sample. The CRSP initial sample contains 10,301 events from 
1,944 firms, including 1,110 dividend cuts and 9,173 dividend increases.  
                                                 
6  LPC Dealscan has been assembling loan daily prices and information about large US corporations 
mainly through lenders’ self-reporting and Securities and Exchange Commission filings. The database uses 
a unique loan identification number identifier to track individual loans.  
7 NYSE American is formerly known as the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NYSE MKT. 
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The procedure used to obtain the final sample comprises two approaches. The first one 
involves merging the dividend and the loan trading datasets by company name. Duplicates are 
dropped from the sample; only the loan trading data surrounding the dividend announcement date 
is kept, meaning that if the first day of trading occurred long before or after the announcement date, 
the observation is dropped. The second approach uses the CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) link 
file to further merge the dividend and the loan trading datasets. The datasets are joined by the 
PERMNO8 (CRSP) and the Global Company Key (GVKEY)9 (Compustat) for the duration of the 
link. If the GVKEY is missing, the observation is deleted. Duplicates are dropped from the sample; 
only the loan trading data surrounding the dividend announcement date is kept. 
Finally, the datasets resulting from both approaches are merged, and the duplicates are 
dropped. The resulting sample contains 810 events from 273 US public firms, of which 708 are 
dividend increases and 102 are dividend cuts. Given the infrequent trading nature of the secondary 
loan market, I drop the observations that show missing loan trading days within a 16-day window 
around the dividend announcement date. The sample window ranges from a minimum of 16 days 
(e.g., -1 to +14) to a maximum of 106 days (-90 to +15). Distressed loans10 are dropped from the 
sample; to address the issue of confounding events, I eliminate the event if there is another type of 
distribution within the period of 15 days before to 15 days after the announcement date. 
The final sample includes 153 companies, covering the period from 2000 to 2016. These 
firms have 354 unique loan facilities trading on the secondary loan market, for which I have daily 
                                                 
8 PERMNO is a unique permanent security identification number assigned by the CRSP to each 
security. 
9 The GVKEY is a unique six-digit number key assigned to each company (issue, currency, and 
index) in the Compustat database. 
10 Distressed loans are traded at a bid price below 90% of the par value (e.g., Altman et al., 2010; Gande & 
Saunders, 2012; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). 
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prices from 90 days before to 15 days after the dividend announcement date. The sample comprises 
626 different events, including 45 dividend cuts, 581 dividend increases. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Dividend expectation model 
The two hypotheses in this study predict a price reaction only to dividend change 
announcements. Quantifying these changes requires a dividend expectation model. In this study, I 
use a naïve model, which forecasts no change in dividends from one period to another, as in 
Aharony and Swary’s (1980) study. The model is consistent with the hypothesis that managers are 
reluctant to change dividends unless they have reason to believe that their firms’ prospects for 
improvement/deterioration are permanent. 
 
4.2.2 Measurement of abnormal loan returns 
The market model is widely accepted as the standard for measuring expected returns. In the 
model, a benchmark return is subtracted from a security’s raw return and follows the underlying 
assumption that the market processes information about the event in an efficient and unbiased 
manner. The following equations are used to calculate the loan return and the benchmark return: 
??? ?
???
???????
? ?? ??????? ?
???
???????
? ??      (1) 
where  
??? = daily rates of return of loan i on day t,  
??? = daily price of loan i on day t, 
??????? = daily price of loan i on day t-1, 
and 
??? = daily rates of return of the loan benchmark on day t,  
??? = daily price of the loan benchmark on day t, 
??????? = daily price of the loan benchmark on day t-1. 
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  The daily rates of return on the loans in the sample are calculated using the loans’ daily 
prices obtained from the LPC database. The LPC defines the daily price of a loan as the average of 
the bid and ask prices. I use the S&P leveraged loan index (LLI)11 as the benchmark for the 
secondary loan market. The market model is then used to determine whether loanholders realized 
abnormal returns in the days surrounding the dividend announcements. Abnormal return????? for 
loan i on day t is estimated as the difference between the loan return and the benchmark return:  
???? ? ??? ? ???         (2) 
 
4.2.3 Cumulative abnormal loan returns 
Cumulative abnormal loan returns (CARs) in the days surrounding the dividend 
announcement (day 0) are obtained by summing AR, over the event time (-t1, …, 0, …, + t2): 
??????????? ? ? ?????????         (3) 
To mitigate the problem of infrequent trading in the secondary loan market, I test the event 
window used by Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) from 60 days before to 15 days after (-60 to 
+15) and Billett et al. (2015) event window of 13 days from 2 days before to 10 days after the 
announcement day (-2 to +10). The reason for Billett et al. choice of a 10-day post announcement 
window is that in their study, a randomly selected loan has an average of one non-stale quote every 
10 days. I also test a shorter event window (-2 to +2) since the effect of dividend changes on the 
equity market concentrates on this window. Abnormal stock returns are calculated using the market 
model with the CRSP value weighted index as the market’s benchmark. The event windows are 
the same as those in the measurement of abnormal loan returns for comparability purposes. 
                                                 
11 The S&P LLI is market-value weighted.  
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4.2.4 Multivariate test 
I test the relationship between abnormal loan returns and firm, loan, and contractual features, 
similar to Billett et al.’ (2015) test. A panel OLS regression, with industry and year fixed effects, is 
calculated as follows: 
??????????? ? ? ? ?????? ? ??????????? ????? ? ??? ? ???????  (4) 
where the dependent variable ??????????? is the CAR from day t1 to day t2 around the dividend 
announcement date (day 0). The variables cut and increase denote the absolute percentage changes 
in dividends from one period to the other. These variables are used to perform slope tests. Based 
on prior literature, the vectors of controls X, Y, and Z comprise a set of firm characteristics, loan 
characteristics, and contractual terms, respectively, which have been proven to influence loan 
returns.  
Following Billett et al. (2015) study, the firm-specific controls include (1) the ratio of total 
debt to total debt plus market value of equity (leverage); (2) the ratio of net property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets (tangibility); (3) the ratio of bank debt to total debt (bankdebt); 
Additionally, I test (4) the firm’s cash and equivalents (cash) because if the firm has enough cash 
to serve its debt obligations after a dividend cut or enough cash to pay for the dividend increase, 
the market will not view the dividend announcement as bad news. 
Following Billett et al. (2015) study, the loan controls consist of (1) a dummy variable equal 
to one if the loan facility is a Term Loan B and above, designed for institutional investors, and zero 
if it is a bank facility (institutional). Based on Wittenberg-Moerman’s (2008) study, the following 
loan control is examined: (2) a dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is a revolver and 
zero if it is a term loan (revolver). 
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Finally, to determine if financial contracting can reduce the effect of dividend changes on 
loan prices, I examine the following variables (following the study of Billett et al., 2015): (1) the 
sum of five dummy variables with covenant indicators: dividend restriction, at least two financial 
covenants, asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, and equity issuance sweep12 (intensity); (2) the 
sum of four dummy variables with incurrence covenants: dividend restriction, asset sales sweep, 
debt issuance sweep, and equity issuance sweep (incurrence); and (3) a dummy variable equal to 
one if the loan has an equity payout restriction and zero otherwise (dividend). See appendix F for 
variable definitions. 
  
                                                 
12 The sweeps require a borrower to prepay the loan with proceeds of asset sales, debt issuance, or 
equity issuance, respectively.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the loans with dividend announcements 
over the sample period from 2000 to 2016. The average dividend change is an increase of 2.4%, 
and the average loan price is 99.00 (par = 100). Panel B reports descriptive statistics by dividend 
announcement type (decrease or increase). The average dividend cut is -58.31% with a loan price 
of 98.51, and the average dividend increase is 24% with a loan price of 99.41. Table 2 presents the 
frequency distributions of events by type of dividend announcement (decrease or increase) and by 
calendar year. The first year of the sample shows a few dividend cuts and no events with dividend 
increases. After 2003, the numbers of dividend increases and dividend cuts seem more constant, 
with an annual average of 3 dividend cuts and 41 dividend increases. The numbers of dividend cuts 
and dividend increases in 2008 and 2009 (financial crisis period) are considerably smaller.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for key borrower and loan characteristics by 
announcement type. As shown in Panel A, firms announcing a dividend cut are smaller, more 
leveraged, less profitable, and have lower credit ratings and less cash in their balance sheets than 
those announcing a dividend increase. Furthermore, firms announcing a dividend cut have an 
average loan of US$1.47 billion and a spread over LIBOR of 307 basis points. Panel B describes 
the loans of firms announcing a dividend increase. Their loans have an average of US$1.98 billion 
and an average spread over LIBOR of 204 basis points. Additionally, the loans of firms announcing 
a dividend cut are less likely to be revolvers and more likely to be tranche loans destined for 
institutional investors than the loans of firms announcing a dividend increase. 
Lastly, since borrowers announcing a dividend cut seem to have a higher financial risk due 
to their higher leverage and lower credit ratings than firms announcing a dividend increase, their 
contracts include more terms to mitigate the risk. About 64% of the loans of firms with a dividend 
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cut are secured by collateral, in contrast to 46% of the loans of firms with a dividend increase. 
Additionally, loans of firms with a dividend cut have more incurrence covenants and a higher 
probability of having a covenant restricting dividend payments than loans of firms with a dividend 
increase do. 
 
5.2 Loan price reaction to dividend announcements 
In this section, I present the loan price reaction around announcements of dividend cuts, 
and dividend increases. Table 4 details the behaviour of loan prices from day -15 to day +15 around 
the dividend announcement date (day 0). As shown in the table, the CAR around dividend cuts is 
negative and highly significant during most of the window. In contrast, the CAR around dividend 
increases, although positive during the entire window, has an inconstant significance level. The 
loan CAR is significant at the 5% level on days 1 and 2 after the dividend announcement date, 
when the largest effect of a dividend increase in stock prices is regularly observed. Loan prices 
return to the same significant level in a longer event window after day 12. The average CAR for 
loans of firms announcing a dividend cut has a negative value (-0.34%), while for loans of firms 
announcing a dividend increase, the average CAR as a positive value (0.06%). 
Panel A of Table 5 presents mean tests for the CARs over eight different event windows for 
the 626 events in the sample. I only discuss a long event window from days -60 to +15, a medium 
event window from days -2 to +10, and a short event window from days -2 to +2. The mean CAR 
from days -60 to +15 for the loans of firms with dividend cuts is -0.86% and significant at the 1% 
level. The CAR is smaller in shorter event windows. The 13-day event window (-2 to +10) 
generates an excess mean return13 of -0.32%, and the short (-2 to +2) event window accrues a 
                                                 
13 The terms excess return and cumulative abnormal return are used interchangeably. 
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cumulative mean return of -0.28%, both significant at the 5% level. Loans of firms with dividend 
increase announcements report positive and significant mean abnormal returns. The excess mean 
return from days -60 to +15 is 0.27% and significant at the 1% level; the abnormal mean return 
from days -2 to +10, although it has a positive return, is insignificant. In a shorter event window 
from days -2 to +2, loans of firms with dividend increases obtain a highly significant cumulative 
mean abnormal return of 0.06%.  
 Panel B of Table 5 presents cumulative mean abnormal returns for a sample where only one 
loan per firm per type of announcement is selected to avoid interdependence among realized returns. 
The selected loan is the most liquid one, with the least number of stale quotes, as reported by 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984). The reduced sample contains 24 dividend cuts, and 140 dividend 
increases. The results are similar to those of the full sample. Consistent with the literature, 
stockholders earn a negative excess mean return around dividend cut announcements and a positive 
excess mean return around dividend increase announcements. As shown in Panel C, the cumulative 
mean abnormal stock return is significantly negative (-16.06%) from days -60 to +15 around 
dividend cuts and significantly positive (2.58%) around dividend increases. In a shorter event 
window (-2 to +2), the stock excess mean return is -1.87% around dividend cuts and a significant 
1.07% around dividend increases. The evidence indicates that loan and stock prices earn a negative 
excess mean return around dividend cuts and a positive excess mean return around dividend 
increases. Therefore, the mean test’s results are consistent with the information content of 
dividends hypothesis. Figure 3 illustrates the loan excess returns in the three main event windows 
for dividend cuts and increases. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal loan returns  
Three event windows from days -60 to +15, -2 to +10, and -2 to +2 around dividend increases and cuts 
 
5.3 Relationship between loan excess return, firm, and loan characteristics 
Table 6 presents the correlations between loan returns, stock returns, firm characteristics, 
loan characteristics, and contractual features. The correlation between the stock excess return and 
the loan excess return is positive although insignificant, indicating that both events react similarly 
to dividend announcements. I further examine the relation between the stock and the loan excess 
returns in the next section. The correlation between a dividend cut and the cumulative abnormal 
stock return is negative and highly significant; a similar negative and highly significant relationship 
is observed between dividend cuts and cumulative abnormal loan returns. A positive and significant 
relationship is also noted between a dividend increase and the stock excess return. A positive but 
insignificant relationship exists between a dividend increase and the loan excess return.  
The correlation matrix indicates that leveraged firms with a high ratio of bank debt to total 
debt are negatively related to abnormal loan returns around dividend announcements; however, 
cash holdings and the use of covenants mitigate this negative effect. Firms are more likely to 
announce a dividend increase when they have less debt, more cash, and fewer covenants. The 
dividend restriction covenant proves to be an effective mechanism, preventing dividend increases 
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and reducing dividend payments. Consistent with previous research results (e.g., Allen et al., 2012), 
this study’s findings show a negative relationship between bank lending and dividend payout policy 
since banks limit dividends to protect the integrity of their senior claim on firms’ assets. The 
intensity of bank lending increases the use of covenants as a monitoring device. 
Table 7 reports on panel OLS regressions of CARs on borrower and loan characteristics. 
The dependent variable is the CAR in three event windows: short (-2 to +2), medium (-2 to +10), 
and long (-60 to +15). Regression models 1–3 examine these three event windows in the entire 
sample of dividend increases and cuts. Models 4–6 reduce the impact of outliers by winsorizing 
the dependent variable at 10% at the firm level. Models 7–9 test the event windows on the reduced 
sample of one loan per borrower per announcement type. In model 10, a new variable is introduced 
to the regression cut dummy, which is equal to one if the announcement is a dividend cut and zero 
if the announcement corresponds to a dividend increase.  
The results are consistent across the models; thus, in the following discussion, I focus on 
the models with the complete sample. First, it should be noted that the loan price reaction to a 
dividend cut is negative and highly significant, meaning that the larger the dividend cut, the more 
negative the loan excess return. The loan price reaction to a dividend increase is insignificant in 
any of the models. Although the mean test and the correlation matrix show a significantly positive 
loan reaction to a dividend increase, the regression does not indicate the same result. The 
asymmetrical reaction to dividend changes is also reported in bond prices by Handjinicolaou and 
Kalay (1984) and Zhao (2016), who find that firms announcing a dividend cut have a significantly 
negative bond price reaction, while the bonds of companies that announce a dividend increase have 
no statistically significant results, partially supporting the information content of dividends 
hypothesis. 
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 The proportion of bank debt to total debt is negatively related to the loan price reaction: the 
larger the proportion of the bank debt in a firm’s capital structure, the more negative the loan excess 
return. This relationship implies that loan losses at the announcement of a dividend change are 
mitigated when the loan has less bank debt presence. Billett et al. (2015) find a similar negative 
relation between the bank–debt ratio and the loan price reaction to an OMR; they explain this 
negative relationship in terms of Park’s (2000) model14.  
Notably, cash15 is positively and significantly related to loan returns. This means that even 
if a firm announces a dividend increase or a dividend cut, if it has enough cash, this would be an 
indicator of financial strength, and investors will not interpret the dividend announcement as bad 
news. Revolver loans have a positive and significant effect on loan prices during short windows, 
whereas institutional tranches have a negative effect on loan returns during long windows. Intensity, 
the sum of the five covenant indicators, is positively related to the loan price reaction around a 
dividend announcement. It means that having covenants to protect loanholders offsets the negative 
reaction to a dividend cut or to a dividend increase financed by either issuing new debt or reducing 
investments. Billett et al. (2015) find that having more covenant restrictions is associated with a 
more negative reaction to an OMR.  
In models 8 and 9, leverage has a significantly negative coefficient, meaning that 
loanholders’ losses are greater, the higher the firm’s financial leverage. Handjinicolaou and Kalay 
                                                 
14 In Park’s (2000) model, moral hazard is very high and, hence, lending takes place only when a 
lender has a motivation to monitor the firm. Since senior (bank) debts have priority claims on the firm’s 
assets over junior (public) debts, the public debtholders have no incentive to monitor but the banks will do 
so as long as liquidation impairs their debt. An impaired bank will get less the larger the bank loan. Thus, a 
small piece of bad news may prompt a bank with a small loan to force a liquidation, while is will take far 
worse information to induce a bank with a large loan to force a liquidation. This means a small bad news is 
informational when bank loan is small but not when it is large. Thus, Park (2000) argues that banks monitor 
more when banks loans are small since they are interested in news even when it is small. 
15 Other definitions of cash holdings, excess cash, and free cash flow have been tested; however, 
the results of these other variables in the OLS regression are not significant. 
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(1984) find a similar negative bond price reaction to an increased leverage, but Billett et al. (2015) 
report a more negative loan price reaction to an OMR, the higher the firm’s leverage becomes.  
Table 8 presents the results for models 11–13, where the dividend increase announcement 
is divided into small (lower than 30%) and large (equal to or higher than 30%) increases, following 
Dhillon and Johnson’s (1994) study. During the three event windows the loan CAR around 
dividend cuts is negative and highly significant, whereas the loan CAR of firms that announce a 
dividend increase is not significant regardless of the size of the announcements, suggesting a 
difference between the reaction of bonds and loans to dividend changes. In Section 5.5, I examine 
the interaction terms between the dividend announcement and five variables: bank–debt ratio, cash, 
financial covenants, dividend covenant, and size of the announcement. 
 
5.4 Correlation between loan and stock returns 
An important implication of both hypotheses is the correlation between the loan and the 
stock returns. In the information content hypothesis, the correlation between the loan and the stock 
excess returns should be positive. In the wealth redistribution hypothesis, the correlation should be 
negative. Since these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, I examine stock and loan returns, 
as well as the correlation between them to differentiate the hypotheses better.  
Table 9 presents the correlations between loan and stock returns when firms increase or cut 
dividends in the three main event windows. The average correlation during dividend cuts is positive 
and significant at 0.28, consistent with the information content hypothesis, and noting that the 
correlation between loan and stock returns is stronger in the longer windows. For dividend 
increases, the evidence is mixed. In a long event window (-60 to +15), the correlation between loan 
and stock returns is significantly positive at 0.108; in a short event window (-2 to +2), the 
correlation is significantly negative at 0.113. Due to the negative correlation between debt and 
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equity returns around dividend increases, a pure information content of dividends hypothesis is 
rejected. The different correlation signs between loan and stock returns suggest that both 
information content and wealth transfer effects are present around dividend increases. Figure 4 
illustrates the hypotheses as supported by the results.  
    
Abnormal 
stock 
return 
Abnormal 
loan 
return 
Correlation 
loan and 
stock 
Dividend 
increase 
Pure information content + + + 
Pure wealth redistribution + - - 
Information content and wealth redistribution + + - 
Wealth redistribution and information content + - + 
Dividend 
cut 
Pure information content - - + 
Pure wealth redistribution - + - 
Information content and wealth redistribution - - - 
Wealth redistribution and information content - + + 
 
Figure 4. Hypotheses supported by the results for both dividend increases and dividend cuts 
 
 
5.5 Cross-sectional analysis 
To demonstrate the non-mutually exclusive nature of the hypotheses, I perform cross-
sectional analysis tests to discover under what conditions bank loan prices react positively or 
negatively to a dividend increase in a short event window (-2 to +2) since the wealth transfer effect 
has been stronger in the short term. I follow Billett et al. (2015) wealth transfer regression of the 
abnormal stock dollar return on the abnormal loan dollar return and other controls: 
           (5) 
where the abnormal stock dollar return (ASR) is computed as the stock CAR multiplied by the 
market value of the firm’s equity in the year prior to the dividend increase announcement. The 
????????? ?? ? ? ? ??? ???????? ?? ? ?????????????????? ??????????? ? ???? 
      
 
37 
 
abnormal loan dollar return (ALR) is calculated as the loan CAR multiplied by the firm’s total debt 
in the year prior to the dividend increase announcement.  
The cross-sectional analysis involves testing different variables that can split the sample 
into two distinct groups with the use of dummy variables. These dummy variables are then 
multiplied by the abnormal loan dollar return (interaction term). The five categories tested are the 
size of the dividend change, the firm’s bank–debt ratio, the firm’s cash holdings, the presence of a 
covenant restricting the payment of dividends, and the presence of at least two financial 
covenants.16 The control variables include a dummy variable (intercept) equal to one if the category 
is large or if it contains a covenant and zero otherwise, as well as the logarithm of the equity’s 
market value.  
First, the dividend increase in the total sample of 581 events is classified into two groups: 
dividend increases with an equal or larger than 30% change and dividend increases with a smaller 
than 30% change, following Dhillon and Johnson’s (1994) study. There are 146 loans of firms with 
a large dividend increase and a mean dividend change of 67%, while there are 435 loans of firms 
with a small dividend increase and a mean change of 14%. The abnormal stock dollar return is then 
regressed on the abnormal loan dollar return slope of both groups, on the intercept dummy variable 
(1 = large dividend change, 0 = small dividend change), and on the log market value of equity. 
Table 10 presents the results of the robustness tests. Panel A includes the results by dividend change, 
bank–debt ratio, and cash holdings. As shown on Panel A, both small and large dividend increases 
have significantly positive coefficients (0.26 and 1.2, respectively), indicating that the loan and the 
stock abnormal dollar returns are positively related, according to the information content of 
                                                 
16 Whenever the text in this section refers to financial covenants, it implies that the loan has at least 
two financial covenants in its contract. 
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dividends hypothesis. 17  The results suggest that investors react more positively when the 
announced dividend increases are large. The distinction between announcements of small and large 
dividend increases do not explain why loanholders might react positively to some announcements 
but negatively to others; therefore, another explanation is required. 
Second, the dividend increases are divided into (1) firms that announced dividend increases 
with small cash holdings and (2) firms that announced dividend increases with large cash holdings. 
The mean cash holdings for the first group with 291 events amount to US$62 million, and those 
for the second group with 290 events are valued at US$1.9 billion. The wealth transfer regression 
conditions the abnormal stock dollar return coefficient on the abnormal loan dollar return by the 
size of cash holdings, the intercept dummy (1 = large cash holdings, 0 = small cash holdings), and 
the log market value of equity. The results show a negative but insignificant relation between 
abnormal dollar returns when cash holdings are small. However, when cash holdings are large, the 
relation between the loan and the stock abnormal dollar returns is significantly positive at 0.26, 
indicating that when a firm announces a dividend increase, if it has a high level of cash to fund the 
disbursement, loan investors will not perceive the dividend increase announcement as bad news.  
The third group classification is divided into (1) firms with a small bank–debt ratio and (2) 
firms with a large bank–debt ratio. The proportion of bank loans in a firm’s capital structure (proxy 
for leverage) has also been tested by Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) and Billett et al. (2015). The 
mean bank–debt ratio for the first group is 0.17 with 302 events, and that for the large group is 0.80 
with 255 events. The wealth transfer regression includes the abnormal loan dollar return slope of 
both groups, the intercept dummy variable (1 = large bank–debt ratio, 0 = small bank–debt ratio), 
and the log market value of equity. This test’s results support both the information content and the 
                                                 
17 Dhillon and Johnson (1994) report a negative bond price reaction to large dividend increases, 
consistent with the wealth transfer effect. 
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wealth redistribution hypotheses. At the announcement of a dividend increase, loan, and stock 
returns of firms with a small bank–debt ratio have a positive relationship with a highly significant 
coefficient of 0.30, while loan and stock returns of firms with a large bank–debt ratio have a 
negative relationship with a highly significant coefficient of -0.83. The results suggest that when 
firms have a high level of bank–debt ratio or leverage, stockholders increase their wealth at the 
expense of loanholders. 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) find that bondholders’ losses are greater at the 
announcement of a dividend cut, the larger the firm’s financial leverage; therefore, bondholders 
are the main losers when their claim on the firm’s assets is high. Billett et al. (2015) arrive at the 
same conclusion, where the abnormal loan dollar return is less negative, and the transfer of wealth 
from loanholders to stockholders is smaller when the ratio of bank debt to total debt is small. They 
propose that according to Park’s (2000) model, a bank’s monitoring incentives are maximized 
when the amount of bank debt is smaller than the amount of non-bank debt. Additionally, Gande 
and Saunders (2012) find evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis on the transfer of wealth 
between the bond and the stock markets. They propose that wealth is redistributed from 
bondholders to stockholders due to the higher financial leverage of traded borrowers and an 
expected decrease in the banks’ monitoring incentives. Another explanation for the loanholders’ 
negative reaction to a dividend increase could be that highly leveraged firms have more restrictions 
preventing the payment of dividends; therefore, loanholders negatively react to a firm’s dividend 
increase announcement. The explanation for the negative loan price reaction could depend on the 
banks’ use of covenants in their debt contracts. The fourth and the fifth group classifications help 
explain the effects of financial contracting on agency conflicts. 
Panel B (Table 10) presents the loanholders’ reaction to contractual terms, such as the 
presence of a dividend covenant and financial covenants. The fourth classification of the abnormal 
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loan dollar return around a dividend increase consists of two conditions: (1) when a loan has a 
covenant preventing the payment of dividends (dummy = 1) and (2) when a loan has no dividend 
covenant (dummy = 0). The dividend increase sample comprises 273 loans with a dividend 
covenant and 308 loans without a dividend covenant. I find a positively significant relation between 
the abnormal stock and the abnormal loan dollar returns (coefficient of 0.28) when a loan lacks a 
covenant preventing the payment of dividends, whereas a significantly negative relation exists 
between the stock and the loan returns (coefficient of -0.84) when a loan has a covenant preventing 
the payment of dividends. These findings indicate that when loans have a covenant in place to 
minimize dividend payments, but firms increase dividends, loanholders negatively react to the 
dividend increase news, and wealth is redistributed from loanholders to stockholders. However, if 
a loan lacks a dividend covenant, loanholders positively react to the dividend increase news, 
supporting the information content of dividends hypothesis. Billett et al. (2015) find a similar 
negative reaction to the failure of the dividend covenant; according to them, loanholders react 
negatively when the loan contract has a dividend covenant to prevent a future cash distribution to 
shareholders.  
Lastly, the fifth classification consists of two conditions: (1) when a loan has at least two 
financial covenants (dummy = 1) and (2) when a loan has no financial covenants (dummy = 0). 
The effects of having financial covenants in a debt contract are similar to those of having a dividend 
covenant. The relation between the abnormal loan and the abnormal stock dollar returns when a 
loan has no financial covenants is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.26), consistent with the 
information content hypothesis. In contrast, although not significant, the relation between the loan 
and the stock returns is negative, and wealth is transferred from debtholders to stockholders when 
the loan has at least two financial covenants in its debt agreement. This result is more 
counterintuitive since debtors are expected to use financial covenants as cheaper forms of 
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monitoring that expose the firm to periodic evaluations; therefore, the use of covenants should 
decrease agency problems and wealth transfer. Billett et al. (2015) results show a positive loan 
price reaction to the presence of two or more financial covenants, decreasing the wealth transfer 
effect around OMR; even more, they find that the presence of financial covenants offsets the 
transfer of wealth effect on the failure of the dividend covenant. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
I have examined a sample of 153 US firms with 45 dividend cuts, and 581 dividend 
increases covering the period from 2000 to 2016. In the sample, firms that announce a dividend cut 
tend to be smaller, more leveraged, and have lower credit ratings and less cash than those 
announcing a dividend increase. The loans of firms announcing a dividend cut tend to have a higher 
spread over LIBOR and are more likely to be tranche loans destined for institutional investors than 
loans of firms announcing a dividend increase; the first group also tends to have more covenants 
and a higher probability of having a covenant restricting the payment of dividends.  
To investigate the loan price reaction to dividend announcements, I have performed four 
tests: an event study with mean tests, a panel OLS regression with slope tests, a correlation test, 
and wealth transfer regressions. First, the mean test’s results are consistent with the information 
content of dividends hypothesis, where firms that announce a dividend increase obtain significantly 
positive abnormal loan returns, and firms that announce a dividend cut gain significantly negative 
abnormal loan returns. Consistent with the literature, stockholders earn negative excess returns 
around dividend cuts and positive excess returns around dividend increases.  
The slope test results in the panel OLS regression reflect an asymmetrical loan price 
reaction to dividend announcements, where dividend cuts negatively affect loan prices, and 
dividend increases have no effect on loan prices, partially supporting the information content of 
dividends hypothesis. I have also examined how firm, loan, and contractual features affect loan 
excess returns. I find that loan losses at the announcement of a dividend change are mitigated when 
the firm has less bank debt presence and higher cash holdings, when the loan is a revolver tranche 
destined for bank debtors, and when the contract contains more covenants protecting loanholders. 
Summarizing the results so far, the mean tests indicate that loan prices react to dividend 
changes, supporting the information content of dividends hypothesis. However, after controlling 
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for firm and loan characteristics, the slope test reflects an asymmetrical loan price reaction to 
dividend changes, where a dividend increase has no effect. To further examine the loan price 
reaction to dividend changes, I have analyzed the correlation between loan and stock returns, an 
important implication of both hypotheses.  
The observed correlation between loan and stock returns surrounding dividend cuts is 
positive in all the event windows, consistent with the information content hypothesis. Around 
dividend increases, the evidence is mixed. In a long event window, the correlation between 
abnormal stock and loan returns is positive; in a short event window, the correlation is negative. 
Since the correlation between debt and equity returns around dividend increases is negative, the 
pure information content of dividends hypothesis is rejected. The correlation test suggests a 
possible transfer of wealth from loanholders to stockholders in the short term when firms have an 
increase in dividends. 
Lastly, the regressions of abnormal loan and stock dollar returns provide direct evidence 
that in some cases, loanholders react according to the information content hypothesis, but in others, 
a significant portion of the stock reaction to a dividend increase is explained by the transfer of 
wealth from loanholders to stockholders. Loan prices positively react to a dividend increase when 
a firm’s bank–debt ratio is small, when a firm has a high level of cash to fund the disbursement, 
when a loan has few or no financial covenants in its contract, and when it has no covenant 
preventing the payment of dividends. In contrast, loan prices negatively react to a dividend increase 
and wealth transfers from loanholders to stockholders when a firm’s bank–debt ratio is large and 
when loans have a covenant preventing the payment of dividends.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Prior researchers have been interested in examining the effect of a dividend change on debt 
instruments; however, the empirical evidence on bond prices is mixed, and loan price behaviour 
around dividend changes has not been studied. Therefore, in this thesis, I have investigated the 
effect of a dividend change announcement on the market value of loans in the secondary loan 
market. I have suggested two hypotheses, the information content of dividends and wealth 
redistribution, to explain loan price behaviour around dividend announcements. The information 
content hypothesis predicts that dividend changes will be positively related to stock and loan 
returns; consequently, stock and loan returns should be positively correlated. Alternatively, the 
wealth redistribution hypothesis suggests that dividend changes are positively related to stock 
returns but negatively related to loan returns; therefore, stock and loan returns should be negatively 
correlated.  
The empirical evidence reveals that when firms announce a dividend cut, the market values 
of stocks and loans decrease, suggesting that dividend reductions contain negative information 
about firms’ future performance. On the contrary, when firms announce a dividend increase, the 
stock market value rises for two reasons: first, dividend increases contain positive information 
about firms’ future performance, and second, wealth is transferred from loanholders to stockholders 
around dividend increases. It is suggested that loanholders negatively react to a dividend increase 
when their claim on a firm’s assets is high and their monitoring incentives are low; therefore, 
loanholders rely more on covenants as cheap forms of monitoring and negatively react to the 
dividend covenant’s failure to prevent future cash distributions. 
This thesis enriches the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to the research that 
examines debt instruments’ reaction to corporate events. It sheds some light on stock and loan price 
responses to changes in dividends. This study’s results show that the information content and the 
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wealth redistribution hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and loan prices react according to a 
combination of both hypotheses. Additionally, this study demonstrates that bondholders and 
loanholders react differently to dividend change announcements. In the bond market, wealth is 
redistributed from bondholders to stockholders around the announcement of large dividend 
increases. This is not the case in the secondary loan market, where dividend increases have no 
effect on loan prices, and the wealth transfer effect is offset by that of the information content of 
dividends. These results are expected since I have posited that banks generate proprietary 
information, are more knowledgeable, and have greater monitoring incentives than bondholders. 
Therefore, a dividend increase is less surprising to loanholders, and the wealth transfer effect is 
less evident. Second, the results improve the understanding of the role of dividends in corporate 
finance. I provide empirical evidence that cash holdings, monitoring incentives, the structure of 
debt contracts, and financial contracting features can help mitigate the costs arising from agency 
conflicts. 
This study has several limitations. I have obtained only a reduced sample of firms 
announcing dividend changes, with loans in the secondary market, which are traded infrequently. 
More attention should be paid to the wealth transfer mechanism in conjunction with the information 
content of dividends in loan prices, delving into further details of the determinants of wealth 
transfer around dividend increases. I have only investigated the short-term loan price response 
following dividend changes, not the long-term performance of loans after dividend announcements. 
Further time-series research on long-term performance, as well as more extensive studies 
controlling for other confounding events that could affect loan prices around dividend 
announcements, could have promising results. Finally, a comparison between bond and loan market 
price reactions to corporate events could provide a better explanation of the agency conflicts 
between debt and equity markets. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
The syndication process works as follows 
 
 
Sources: Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Sufi (2007), Ivashina and Sun (2011a)  
 
  
• The lead arranger or agent in a syndicate negotiates a preliminary loan
agreement that includes the loan amount, interest rate, covenants, fees and
collateral
• The agent then turns to potential participant lenders to fund the loan and 
informally polls a group of investors to assess the demand for the loan
• The agent first syndicates part of the loan to banks and then opens 
syndication process to institutional investors by proposing an initial range of 
loan spreads over LIBOR 
• For acting as a managing agent, the lead lender collects a fee paid by the 
borrowing firm
• Once the syndication is open, investors submit the maximum amount of the 
loan they are willing to buy at a given spread
• At the end of the day, a minimum clearing spread is calculated and investors 
who bid that spread or below are granted a share of the loan 
      
 
51 
 
Appendix B 
Events promoting the growth of the secondary loan market 
Date Event 
1987 The Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) starts the publication of the “gold sheets” which 
contains standardized data on syndicated loan pricing 
1988 The Basel Accord encouraged banks to reduce their credit risk exposure to borrowers 
to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage 
1990 The adoption of SEC rule 144A increased the liquidity of the U.S. market for equity 
and debt securities by allowing institutional investors to trade more freely 
1995 The Loan Syndication Trading Association (LSTA) is founded. This event promoted 
the standardization of loan documentation and settlement procedures 
1995 Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch-ICBA started rating syndicated loans 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
The LSTA published a code of conduct that promotes integrity, fairness, efficiency, 
and liquidity through the adoption of common standards 
The LSTA and S&P created the first loan index, the S&P/LSTA Leverage Loan Index 
(LLI), which has become the standard benchmarking tool in the industry 
The Wall Street Journal began weekly coverage of the syndicated loan market 
publishing prices for the most widely quoted loans 
Leveraged lending and trading volumes increased by nearly 200% from 2003 to 2007, 
this growth was driven by M&A activity and large LBOs. Although institutional 
investors played a big role in this phase, the growth was only possible because of the 
emergence of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) 
2008 
2013 
 
2015 
2016 
The financial crisis led to a recession in the USA with record levels of default rates 
Investment grade asset classes’ (senior secured, floating rate) along with the 
standardization of legal and market practices helped the market expand after the crisis 
As the price of oil plummeted and global economies weakened, loan sales declined 
Risk assets and commodities rallied, lifting loan sales volumes, and pushing the loan 
price back above par to 100.25 
Sources: LSTA, Marsh and Basta (2017), Thomas and Wang (2004), Gupta et al. (2008) 
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Appendix C 
Benefits and costs of loan sales by author 
 
  
Costs for borrowers 
Drucker and Puri (2009) 
? Borrowers are more likely to 
receive loans in the future 
? Lending relationships 
involving high risk-borrowers 
are more durable 
 
Santos and Nigro (2009) 
? Borrowers of liquid trading 
loans can borrow at lower 
interest rates 
Gande and Saunders (2012) 
? Alleviate a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial 
constraints 
? A sale for the first time elicits 
a positive stock price effect  
? Borrowers receive larger 
amount of loans post loan sale 
? Firms can invest new funds in 
additional NPV projects 
Kamstra et al. (2014) 
? Reduced borrowing costs are 
largely enjoyed by firms with 
noninvestment grade debt 
? Increased liquidity  
? Facilitates portfolio and risk 
management 
 
Santos and Nigro (2009) 
? Decline in bank monitoring 
incentives 
? The number of creditors 
increases, making future 
renegotiations more difficult 
 
Bhasin and Carey (1999) 
? High fixed dollar assignment 
fees, payable to the lead lender 
 
Kamstra et al. (2014) 
? A sale conveys negative 
information about the 
borrowers’ financial situation 
? Higher costs if renegotiation 
becomes necessary 
? The cost of borrowing 
appears to rise for firms with 
investment grade debt 
Drucker and Puri (2009) 
? Reduced monitoring 
? Borrowers incur additional 
costs in the form of more 
restrictive loan covenants 
? Exacerbates agency problems 
between lenders and 
borrowers 
Benefits for borrowers 
Benefits for lenders 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) 
? Strategy for enhancing fee 
income 
? Manage interest rate risk 
? Limit the maximum size of 
any single loan to a portion of 
the bank’s equity capital 
? Voluntary diversification 
motive 
 
Drucker and Puri (2009) 
? Diversify loan portfolios 
? Comply with risk-adequacy 
regulations 
? Continue to fund profitable 
projects when capital is 
constrained or when facing 
internal lending costs 
? Reduce exposure to individual 
borrowers 
Gupta et al. (2008) 
? Avoid excessive risk 
concentration to a particular 
obligor or industry 
? Move on to higher return 
opportunities 
? Strategic shifts in lending 
strategies 
? Regulatory constraints under 
the Basel Accord 
Parlour and Plantin (2008) 
? Recycle their funds 
? Trade on private information 
? Obtain a socially desirable 
risk-based capital requirement 
Santos and Nigro (2009) 
? Free up capital 
? Generate fee-based income 
? Facilitate risk management 
Gande and Saunders (2012) 
? Better risk-management tools 
? Allows banks to convert their 
illiquid assets into liquid 
assets 
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Appendix D 
Agency problems and information asymmetry in loan sales 
Author/s Year Key Findings 
Dennis and 
Mullineaux 
2000 ? The reputation of the lead agent, as reﬂected in the volume of repeat business or 
in the agent’s own credit rating, can attenuate some of the agency problems 
Drucker 
and Puri 
2009 ? Participant lenders are likely to have less information and ability to monitor 
? Loan contracting is a mechanism to mitigate agency and information problems  
? Covenants are a cheaper form of monitoring and allow the lender to intervene 
before severe losses are realized 
? More restrictive covenants have a larger effect when credit rating agencies 
disagree on the credit of the borrower and when lenders are not as reputable 
Gorton and 
Pennacchi 
1995 
 
? Loans are nonmarketable assets because of their moral hazard problem 
? There are two contractual features that could mitigate the moral hazard problem: 
A guarantee by the lead bank to repurchase the loan if it underperforms and 
retaining a portion of the loan 
? The greater the portion of the loan held by the bank, the greater its incentive to 
monitor and evaluate the borrower 
? Banks sell a larger portion of the loan if they face a greater internal funding cost 
? Banks will retain a larger proportion of more risky loans  
? Banks retain a smaller share of the loan, the greater the quality of their guarantee 
Sufi 2007 ? More reputable lead arrangers retain less of the loan 
? The lead arranger retains a smaller share of the loan with relatively transparent 
borrowers and when there is a previous relationship between them 
? Lead arrangers retain a larger share of unsecured loans or when the borrower is 
new in the syndicated loan market, private or unrated  
? A lead arranger retains a larger share of the loan when the borrower requires more 
due diligence and monitoring 
When information asymmetry is severe, lead arrangers choose participant lenders 
that are geographically closer to the firm and that have previously been on a 
syndicated loan with either the borrower or the leader itself 
Winton and 
Yerramilli 
2015 ? Market participants can use the history of defaults on the bank’s past loans to 
form their beliefs about the bank’s “reputation” 
? The bank can maintain its incentives to monitor out of concern for its reputation, 
which is endogenously determined 
? Loan retention and reputation are substitutes; that is, if the bank’s reputation is 
damaged, then it must retain a higher proportion of the loan 
? A bank with a bad reputation obtains a lower secondary loan market price  
Wittenberg-
Moerman 
2008 ? Information asymmetry is more substantial in private borrowers 
? The longer maturity of institutional loans causes higher information asymmetry 
? Loan syndicated by more reputable arrangers are traded at lower spreads 
? Public reporting and the availability of a credit rating decrease information 
asymmetry 
? Conservative financial reporting eases monitoring and reduces agency costs 
? The timely incorporation of economic losses in a borrower’s financial statements 
triggered by covenants violations enhances corporate governance and decreases 
information asymmetry 
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Appendix E 
Alternatives to address agency problems between managers and shareholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms can precommit to cash distributions to shareholders or debtholders to address managerial 
agency conflicts (John et al., 2015). 
Large creditors can also reduce agency problems with the variety of control rights they receive 
and ability to interfere in the major decisions of the firm. These might include the threat of 
bankruptcy, oversight of debt covenants, the reduction of overinvestment, and the right to 
remove managers or to grab assets that serve as collateral for loans (Jensen, 1986; John et al., 
2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Increasing dividends 
Dividend payments signal to the market that there is less cash at 
the expense of the management to expropriate and this is 
associated with lower information asymmetries (Farooq & 
Jabbouri, 2015). 
Repurchases can reduce resources under managers’ control that 
would otherwise be invested in low-return projects or wasted 
(Jensen, 1986) 
Repurchasing stock 
Debt payments reduce free cash flow and expose the manager to 
additional oversight from external financing markets (John et 
al., 2015). 
Debt creation 
Firms would rather pre-
commit through a 
combination or through 
dividends alone 
The adoption of regular quarterly cash 
dividends leaves investors with a 
stronger expectation of continued 
payouts in the future.  (John et al., 
2015). 
Debt creation can be an 
effective corporate 
governance mechanism 
that substitutes dividends 
When managers issue debt in exchange 
for stock, they are bound to pay out 
future cash flows in a more rigorous way 
since banks have the right to liquidate 
the firm (Jensen, 1986). 
Dividends  
or debt? 
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Appendix F 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition (source) 
A. Main variables  
Cumulative abnormal loan  
return 
Loan CAR from day t1 to day t2 around the dividend 
announcement date calculated using the market model with the 
S&P leveraged loan index as the benchmark return for the 
secondary loan market. (Dealscan) 
Cumulative abnormal stock  
return 
Stock CAR from day t1 to day t2 around the dividend 
announcement date calculated using the market model with the 
CRSP value weighted index as the market’s benchmark. (CRSP) 
Abnormal loan dollar return 
 
Loan CAR multiplied by the firm’s total debt in the year prior to 
the dividend increase announcement. (Dealscan) 
Abnormal stock dollar return Stock CAR multiplied by the market value of the firm’s equity 
in the year prior to the dividend increase announcement. 
(CRSP) 
Cut Absolute percentage change in dividend cuts from one period 
to the other (CRSP) 
Increase Absolute percentage change in dividend increases from one 
period to the other (CRSP) 
Market value of equity Number of common shares outstanding times the closing share 
price. (CRSP) 
Dividend change Dummy variable equal to one if the dividend change is large 
(above 30%) and zero if the dividend change is small (below 
30%). (CRSP) 
B. Firm characteristics  
Market value of equity Logarithm of the number of common shares outstanding times 
the closing share price. (CRSP) 
Market leverage ratio Ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
to total debt plus market value of equity. (Compustat) 
Asset Tangibility Ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
(Compustat) 
Bank debt ratio Ratio of bank debt to total debt, where bank debt is imputed from 
Compustat as the category other long-term debt (DLTO) minus 
commercial paper (CMP) and total debt is long-term debt 
(DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC). Note that other 
long-term debt is included in long-term debt. (Compustat)  
Bank debt Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s bank debt ratio is large 
and zero if the firm’s bank debt ratio is small. (Compustat) 
      
 
56 
 
Cash Logarithm of the firm’s cash and equivalents. (Compustat) 
Cash holdings Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has large cash holdings 
and zero if the firm has small cash holdings. (Compustat) 
C. Loan characteristics  
Institutional loan Dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is designed for 
institutional investors, and zero otherwise. Loans designed for 
institutional investors are classified as Term Loan B’s and have 
payout schedules similar to bonds (e.g., bullet payment at 
maturity). (Dealscan) 
Revolver A dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is a revolver 
and zero if it is a term loan (Dealscan) 
D. Contractual terms  
Covenant intensity index Sum of five covenant indicators: dividend restriction (typically 
covering all payouts to equity); at least two financial covenants 
(e.g., debt issuance restrictions); asset sales sweep; debt issuance 
sweep; and equity issuance sweep. Note that sweeps require a 
borrower to prepay the loan with proceeds of assets sales, debt 
issuance, or equity issuance, respectively. (Dealscan) 
Incurrence covenant index Sum of four incurrence covenant indicators: dividend restriction; 
asset sales sweep; debt issuance sweep; and equity issuance 
sweep. (Dealscan) 
Dividend restriction 
covenant 
Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has an equity payout 
restriction, and zero otherwise. (Dealscan) 
Financial covenants Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has at least two financial 
covenants, and zero otherwise. (Dealscan) 
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Table 1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics  
      
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dividend change 0.02 0.13 -0.92 1.5 
Loan price 99.00 2.10 90.00 105.42 
Bid 98.59 2.29 89.00 105.04 
Ask 99.41 1.94 90.55 105.79 
Number of events 626       
Panel B. Descriptive statistics by announcement type     
  Measurement Cut  Increase 
Event Frequency  45  581  
Dividend change Mean -0.58  0.24 
 Median -0.60  0.16 
     Std. Dev. 0.23  0.23 
Loan price Mean 98.51  99.41 
     Std. Dev. 2.90  1.64 
Bid Mean 98.06  99.02 
     Std. Dev. 3.19  1.78 
Ask Mean 98.96  99.79 
     Std. Dev. 2.63  1.53 
Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the loans with dividend announcements over the 
sample period from 2000 to 2016. Panel B reports descriptive statistics by dividend announcement 
type (cuts and increases). 
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Table 2 Frequency distributions of loans involved in dividend announcements 
Loan level 
Year Cut Increase   Total % 
2000 6 0  6 2.01 
2001 0 6  6 2.14 
2002 0 8  8 2.46 
2003 0 30  30 4.32 
2004 4 35  39 5.58 
2005 4 54  58 6.99 
2006 3 38  41 7.96 
2007 4 48  52 9.50 
2008 0 21  21 4.32 
2009 0 9  9 3.02 
2010 3 24  27 5.05 
2011 1 39  40 6.09 
2012 3 41  44 6.97 
2013 7 74  81 9.45 
2014 3 75  78 9.26 
2015 3 40  43 7.42 
2016 4 39  43 6.44 
Total 45 581  626 100 
Note: The table at the loan level reports frequency distributions of events by type of announcement 
(decrease or increase) and by calendar year.  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for key borrower and loan characteristics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for key borrower and loan characteristics for dividend cuts 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Equity 45 13.60 1.29 10.91 16.47 
Leverage 45 0.25 0.23 0 0.99 
Cash and equivalents 45 2.81 5.11 0 22.57 
S&P Rating 22 3.50 0.71 3 4 
ROE 31 0.07 0.56 1.04 1.70 
Market to book ratio 43 3.92 4.83 0.84 20.15 
Bank debt ratio 43 0.50 0.36 0 1.00 
Loan determinants 
Loan size 39 1.47 1.33 0.13 4.03 
Spread 34 3.07% 0.01 1.38% 6.75% 
Revolver 45 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Institutional 45 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Secured 45 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Financial covenants 45 1.60 1.21 0 4 
Dividend restriction 45 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Intensity 45 2.18 1.93 0 5 
      
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for key borrower and loan characteristics for dividend increases 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Equity 581 15.32 1.50 11.82 19.37 
Leverage 560 0.07 0.13 0 1.88 
Cash and equivalents 560 10.34 25.13 0 313.82 
S&P Rating 310 2.56 0.71 1 4 
ROE 445 0.21 0.98 -3.89 8.12 
Market to book ratio 558 10.31 8.01 0.44 63.73 
Bank debt ratio 557 0.46 0.36 0 1.00 
Loan determinants 
Loan size 490 1.98 2.28 0.04 12.70 
Spread 464 2.04% 0.00 0.15% 8.75% 
Revolver 581 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Institutional 581 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Secured 581 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Financial covenants 581 1.35 1.30 0 6 
Dividend restriction 581 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Intensity 581 1.49 1.76 0 5 
Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for borrower and loans with dividend cuts over the 
sample period. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the group with dividend increases. 
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Table 4 Abnormal and cumulative abnormal loan returns for dividend cuts and increases 
    Dividend cut   Dividend increase 
Day   AR (%) CAR (%) N   AR (%) CAR (%) N 
-15   -0.02 -0.02   48   0.01 0.01   550 
-14   -0.01 -0.02   48   0.01 0.02 * 550 
-13   -0.05 -0.07 * 48   0.00 0.02 * 550 
-12   -0.01 -0.08 ** 50   0.01 0.03 ** 550 
-11   -0.03 -0.11 ** 50   0.00 0.04 * 551 
-10   -0.04 -0.15 *** 51   0.00 0.04 * 554 
-9   -0.05 -0.19 *** 54   -0.01 0.03   555 
-8   0.00 -0.20 ** 54   -0.01 0.02   556 
-7   -0.05 -0.25 *** 55   0.00 0.02   557 
-6   -0.02 -0.27 *** 55   0.00 0.02   559 
-5   0.03 -0.23 ** 55   0.02 0.04   562 
-4   -0.02 -0.26 ** 55   0.00 0.04   564 
-3   0.00 -0.26 ** 55   0.00 0.04   566 
-2   -0.01 -0.27 ** 55   0.00 0.04   568 
-1   -0.02 -0.29 *** 57   0.02 0.06   568 
0   0.02 -0.27 ** 58   0.01 0.08 * 568 
1   -0.11 -0.38 *** 58   0.01 0.09 ** 567 
2   -0.08 -0.46 *** 58   0.01 0.10 ** 567 
3   -0.01 -0.48 *** 58   -0.02 0.07 * 566 
4   -0.02 -0.49 *** 58   0.00 0.08 * 565 
5   0.01 -0.48 *** 58   0.00 0.08 * 565 
6   0.00 -0.48 *** 58   0.00 0.08 * 565 
7   -0.03 -0.51 *** 58   0.00 0.07   565 
8   0.02 -0.49 *** 58   0.01 0.08 * 565 
9   0.02 -0.47 *** 58   -0.01 0.08   565 
10   -0.02 -0.49 *** 57   0.00 0.08   559 
11   -0.03 -0.52 *** 57   0.00 0.08   559 
12   -0.02 -0.53 *** 57   0.02 0.10 ** 557 
13   -0.04 -0.57 *** 57   0.00 0.11 ** 557 
14   0.01 -0.56 *** 56   0.00 0.11 ** 556 
15   -0.02 -0.58 *** 53   0.00 0.10 ** 555 
Note: The table shows the abnormal loan return, cumulative abnormal loan return and event 
frequency of dividend cuts and increases from day -15 to +15 around the dividend announcement 
date (day 0). I use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, 
respectively. 
      
 
61 
 
Table 5 Cumulative abnormal loan return over different event windows 
Panel  A. Loan CAR by type of announcement 
  Dividend cut     Dividend increase 
Event window 
CAR 
(%)  t-stat   
CAR 
(%)  t-stat 
Day -90 to +15 -0.879 *** -3.08   0.283 ** 2.33 
Day -60 to +15 -0.861 *** -3.20   0.271 *** 3.15 
Day -30 to +15 -0.802 *** -3.25   0.062 * 1.75 
Day -15 to +15 -0.627 *** -3.05   0.095 ** 1.93 
Day -2+10 -0.323 ** -2.21   0.038  1.21 
Day -5 to +5 -0.272 ** -2.18   0.056 ** 1.90 
Day -2 to +2 -0.276 ** -2.00   0.056 *** 3.03 
Day -1 to +1 -0.147  -1.27   0.046 *** 3.68 
                  
Panel B. Loan CAR one loan per firm   
  Dividend cut     Dividend increase 
Event window 
CAR 
(%)  t-stat   
CAR 
(%)  t-stat 
Day -90 to +15 -0.809 * -1.93   0.809 *** 3.71 
Day -60 to +15 -0.810 ** -2.16   0.596 *** 3.14 
Day -30 to +15 -0.741 ** -2.26   0.231  1.44 
Day -15 to +15 -0.603 ** -2.39   0.241 ** 1.91 
Day -2+10 -0.289 * -1.71   0.105  1.22 
Day -5 to +5 -0.227 * -1.75   0.126 * 1.84 
Day -2 to +2 -0.280 * -1.71   0.099 ** 2.30 
Day -1 to +1 -0.115  -1.15   0.081 *** 2.71 
                  
Panel C. Stock CAR by type of announcement 
  Dividend cut     Dividend increase 
Event window 
CAR 
(%)  t-stat   
CAR 
(%)  t-stat 
Day -90 to +15 -20.590 *** -4.25   3.457 *** 5.18 
Day -60 to +15 -16.060 *** -4.22   2.583 *** 4.42 
Day -30 to +15 -8.848 *** -2.74   1.441 *** 3.12 
Day -15 to +15 -3.199  -1.13   1.429 *** 3.34 
Day -2+10 -2.509  -0.94   0.806 *** 2.65 
Day -5 to +5 -2.790  -1.19   1.237 *** 4.45 
Day -2 to +2 -1.871  -0.86   1.067 *** 4.73 
Day -1 to +1 -1.120   -0.75     1.063 *** 6.22 
Note: The table reports cumulative abnormal loan returns by event type. I use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8 Determinants of loan returns of small and large dividend announcements 
Model (11)   (12)   (13)   
Event window (-2+2)   (-2+10)   (-60+15)   
Cut -0.319 *** -0.326 ** -0.794 *** 
  (-3.45)   (-2.10)   (-2.70)   
Small increase 0.358   0.690   0.447   
  (0.23)   (1.37)   (0.83)   
Large increase 0.098   0.141   -0.207   
  (0.31)   (0.87)   (-0.55)   
Leverage 0.065   -0.019   -0.784   
  (0.66)   (-0.08)   (-1.36)   
Tangibility -0.139   -0.175   0.104   
  (0.17)   (-1.03)   (0.26)   
Bank debt -0.635 *** -0.797 *** -1.238 *** 
  (-5.51)   (-4.13)   (-2.76)   
1st_quartile -0.600 *** -0.709 *** -0.842 ** 
  (-5.72)   (-4.04)   (-2.06)   
2nd_quartile -0.446 *** -0.513 *** -0.838 *** 
  (-5.65)   (-3.89)   (-2.73)   
3rd_quartile -0.319 *** -0.369 *** -0.589 ** 
  (-4.70)   (-3.25)   (-2.23)   
Cash 0.016 ** 0.017   0.023   
  (1.97)   (1.24)   (0.72)   
Institutional 0.005   -0.065   -0.341 ** 
  (0.12)   (-0.84)   (-1.90)   
Revolver 0.114 ** 0.126   -0.032   
  (2.20)   (1.45)   (-0.16)   
Intensity 0.111 * 0.070   0.423 * 
  (1.82)   (0.68)   (1.79)   
Incurrence -0.122 * -0.050   -0.352   
  (-1.69)   (-0.41)   (-1.25)   
Dividend 0.011   -0.009   -0.313   
  (0.15)   (-0.08)   (-1.13)   
Constant 1.258 *** 1.053 *** 2.642 *** 
  (5.04)   (2.52)   (2.72)   
              
R-squared 0.2595   0.1559   0.3424   
Adj. R-squared 0.2089   0.0982   0.2975   
Observations 626   626   626   
Industry FE YES   YES   YES   
Time FE YES   YES   YES   
Note: The table reports determinants of loan returns of dividend cuts and small and large dividend 
increases (above 30%), the variables denote the absolute percentage change from one period to the 
other. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal loan return in three event windows. I use 
***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 Correlations between loan and stock returns 
Correlations between loan and stock returns around dividend cuts and dividend increases 
 
     Dividend cut       Dividend increase 
  Days -60 to +15      0.2972   **       0.1085  *** 
  Days -2 to +10      0.2609   *  -    0.0435    
  Days -2 to +2      0.2822   *  -    0.1126  *** 
Note: The table reports correlations between loan and stock returns when firms increase or cut 
dividends in different event windows. I use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1% level, 
5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 Wealth transfer regressions from day -2 to +2 around dividend increases 
Regressions of the abnormal stock dollar return (ASR) on the abnormal loan dollar return (ALR) 
Panel A. Abnormal loan dollar return by small or large dividend change, bank-debt ratio, and cash holdings  
Dividend change Cash holdings      Bank-debt 
ALR x small size dummy 0.259 *** -0.161  0.302 *** 
 (5.57)  (-0.24)  (6.55)  
ALR x large size dummy 1.205 *** 0.262 *** -0.827 *** 
 (2.64)  (5.55)  (-3.39)  
Large size dummy 0.281 *** 0.016  0.319 *** 
 (4.00)  (0.21)  (5.20)  
Log market value of equity 16.669 *** 16.964 *** 19.466 *** 
 (8.11)  (6.69)  (9.48)  
Constant -2.458 *** -2.438 *** -2.951 *** 
 (-7.78)  (-6.61)  (-9.16)  
Adj. R-squared 0.1948  0.1650  0.2261  
Observations 581 
 
581  581  
Panel B. Abnormal loan dollar return with or without a dividend and financial covenants 
 Dividend covenant Financial covenants  
ALR x no covenant dummy 0.279 *** 0.262 ***   
 (5.93)  (5.56)    
ALR x covenant dummy -0.840 *** -0.546    
 (-2.52)  (-0.69)    
Covenant dummy -0.059  0.021    
 (-0.93)  (0.26)    
Log market value of equity 17.092 *** 17.544 ***   
 (8.09)  (8.20)    
Constant -2.420 *** -2.522 ***   
 (-7.29)  (-7.59)    
Adj. R-squared 0.1818  0.1659    
Observations 581 
 
581 
 
  
Note: The table reports regressions of the abnormal stock dollar return on the interaction between 
the abnormal loan dollar return and a size dummy or covenant dummy. There are five dummy 
variables or categories: the size of the dividend change, the firm’s bank-debt ratio, the firm’s cash 
holdings, the presence of a dividend covenant and the presence of at least two financial covenants. 
The controls used are: a dummy variable equal to one if the category is large or if it contains a 
covenant, and zero otherwise, and the logarithm of the market value of equity.  I use ***, **, and 
* to denote significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.  
